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T
he article by Nordin et al. (1) in this issue of Emerging
Infectious Diseases describes the use of syndromic
surveillance to detect inhalational anthrax resulting from a
hypothetical covert release of Bacillus anthracis spores at
a major shopping mall. This study is an important evalua-
tion of syndromic surveillance’s utility in detecting an
inhalational anthrax epidemic against a background of real
patient presentations. Based on historical clinical data
from a large health maintenance organization (HMO), the
authors evaluated the sensitivity of a syndromic surveil-
lance system to detect an incident by season of the year,
day of the week when the release occurred, and attack rate
in mall patrons.
Although numbers of persons exposed and becoming ill,
as modeled in the study, are not specified, the effect can be
inferred from the specified methods. On the basis of infor-
mation from the mall’s Web site (2) and the methods stated
in the article, the number of cases associated with a 15%
attack rate in mall visitors (115,000 daily average) and
workers (12,000) would be ≈19,000 (if no additional expo-
sures occurred after day of release). Of these patients, 59%
would be from the metropolitan area in which the mall was
located, an additional 6% would reside within a 150-mile
radius of the metropolitan area, and the remainder would be
from more distant points, including international visitors.
Syndromic surveillance, with the HMO patient database,
would detect 50% of such incidents by day 5, with only
20% detected by day 4. Lesser attack rates would notably
lower the probability of detection. Even more problematic,
the syndromic surveillance systems, as modeled, would fail
to detect the outbreak in 13% of releases in summer and
47% of releases in winter. Performance would improve
markedly with higher attack rates. After detection of an
aberrant signal, the occurrence of a syndrome must be
investigated to determine the cause, and exposure history of
patients must be determined to discover the source. These
investigations could result in additional delay before a tar-
geted response could be mounted to prevent more illnesses.
Such delays are problematic because the effectiveness of
postexposure prophylaxis for inhalational anthrax is related
to speed of implementation (3).
The authors point out that an astute clinician might
diagnose inhalational anthrax in a patient before syn-
dromic surveillance detected that an outbreak of some type
was occurring. If, as the 15% attack rate scenario suggests,
>100 patients had onset of illness on day 2 after exposure,
a correct diagnosis could be established for at least 1
patient by day 4. By this time, hundreds of inhalational
anthrax patients would be seen at hospitals, at least 1 day
before the syndromic surveillance system, as modeled,
would have a 50% probability of signaling the outbreak.
The issue now becomes whether or not syndromic sur-
veillance can augment the public health response to an out-
break. For example, if a syndromic surveillance system
allowed follow-up of individual cases, it might accelerate
case finding and investigation into the source of infection.
This potential role of syndromic surveillance was not
included in the modeled scenario.
Syndromic surveillance systems, of the type modeled
by Nordin et al., may be too slow to allow public health
officials and policy makers to mount a sufficiently rapid
postexposure prophylaxis campaign. Therefore, the ability
of many current syndromic surveillance systems to rapidly
detect bioterrorist attacks needs to be improved. Another
reason to improve syndromic surveillance systems is that
the systems may have public health value other than
detecting bioterrorist attacks, such as tracking the course
of seasonal diseases. We should not forget, however, that
clinical care providers will continue to have a critical role
in detecting bioterrorist attacks, and communications must
be maintained with these first-line sentinels.
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